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In this paper we develop and use the concept of a semi-public
good. A semi-public good is defined as an ordered pair of commodi-
ties, the first one being a private commodity and the second one a
public good, which are related to each other by an inequality
constraint for each individual agent. This approach allows us to
design economic institutions which carry out price discrimination
among users of a semi-public good. People who are seriously ham-
pered by too small a provision of a public good, because it con-
strains their use of the private commodity, are willing to pay a
mark-up on the price for the latter one if this mark-up is spent
for expanding the provision of the public good. In the model the
availability of a public good is planned and organized by a
central planner. The consumer's willingness to pay an individual
mark-up on the price of a private commodity reflects his pre-
ferences for the availability of the public good. These mark-ups
are collected by the private goods industry and transferred to the
central planner in order to cover the costs of the public good
infrastucture. This framework of a private industry and a central
planner providing semi-public goods is called an industrial econ-
omy. The model will be illustrated by some numerical examples.
1. INTRODUCTION
General equilibrium models in economic theory are isomorphic to fixed
point theorems. This insight is due to Von Neumann [18], who applied
Brouwer's fixed point theorem to prove the existence of a process of pro-
~ This research is part of the VF-program "Equilibrium and disequilibrium
in demand and supply", which has been approved by the Netherlands Ministry
of Education and Sciences.z
portional growth in a competitive economy. McKenzie [11], Arrow and Debreu
[1] and other authors used this tool in the fifties to prove existence of
an equilibrium for the model designed by Walras [19J. T'hus they have put
the general equilibrium model for an economy with private goods only and
with private ownership, on a solid axiomatic foundation.
The mathematical tools were strong enough to extend the economy with
public goods, a concept introduced by Ssmuelson [15]. The concept of pub-
lic goods has been studied intensively, for example see Cornes and Sandler
[3]. The problems raised since Samuelson in public good models are more
related to economic behaviour and institutions than to mathematical limi-
tations. One of the fundamental issues in the theory of public goods is
the individual's revelation of preferences about the provision of public
goods. It is individually rational to behave as a free rider, but it is
socially harmful. Many solutions for this problem have been proposed and
rejected. It is still an unresolved issue in economic theory. For a recent
survey we refer to Bltimel, Pethig and Von dem Hagen [2].
In this paper we develop and use the concept of a semi-public good,
introduced by Ruys [14]. A semi-public good is defined as an ordered pair
of commodities, the first one being a private good and the second one a
public good. The amount yl of consumption of agent i of the private good
and the amount z of availability of the public good are related to each
other by an individual inequality constraint yi 5 ci(z) for each agent i.
This constraint might be implicitly expressed in the consumer's utility
function or the producer's production function. But the explicit formula-
tion makes it possible to distinguish between whether an individual con-
straint is binding or not. If for some agent, say consumer i, the con-
straint is binding, then an increase of z has a direct effect on his de-
mand because of the fact that z appears in the consumer's utility func-
tion, but it also has an indirect effect through the weakening of the
constraint. The price for raising z offered by a truth-telling consumer
will reflect the impact of both effects on his utility. The part reflect-
ing the constraint will show up as a mark-up on the market price the con-
sumer is willing to pay for the private commodity. If no agent in the
economy feels himself constrained, the semi-public good reduces to a pri-
vate good having a uniform market price, and a pure public good with, if
desired, Lindahl prices. In general, the definition of a semi-public good3
is relevant only if the constraints are binding for a considerable number
of agents.
The main advantage of this approach is that economic institutions can
be designed which make price discrimination possible among users of a
semi-public good. People who are seriously hampered by too small a provi-
sion of a public good, because it constrains their use of the private
commodity, are thought of forming (political) pressure groups to expand
its provision, or are informing the industry otherwise. They are also
willing to pay a mark-up on the price of the private commodity if this
mark-up is spent on expanding the provision of the public good. In the
context of an industrial economy the enterprises in an industry discrimi-
nate between consumers by setting different príces, and not the public
authority or the planner. These differentiated prices inform the planner
and partially finance the public good.
We will explore a model in which there is just one industry producing
private goods, which form semi-public goods with a public good. The infra-
structure of this public good is planned and organized by a central plan-
ner. The consumer's willingness to pay an individual mark-up on each of
the prices of these private commodities reflects his preferences for the
infrastructure of the public good. These mark-ups are collected by the
private goods industry and transferred to the central planner in order to
cover the costs of the public good infrastructure. As an alternative the
private goods industry may levy a uniform mark-up on the prices of the
private commodities to provide an infrastructure necessary for using their
products. We call this framework of a central planner and private firms
providing together semi-public goods an industrial economy.
It is evident that there are many spill-over effects resulting from any
decision about the provision of a semi-public good. This calls for a
general equilibrium approach, with an associated fixed point or zero point
formulation. In order to calculate a fixed point, simplicial algorithms
first have been designed by Scarf [16,1~] and Kuhn [6,~] for fixed point
problems on the unit price simplex. Van der Laan and Talman [9] developed
a variable dimension algorithm for problems on the unit simplex. Similar
algorithms for fixed or zero point problems on Rn have been introduced by
van der Lasn and Talman [10], Wright [20], Kojima and Yamamoto [5], and
others. These algorithms allow for fast movements in lower dimensional
spaces and are therefore very efficient. A code for these algorithids has4
been implemented on the computer by Seelen, see [8]. We will use this code
for solving some numerical examples to illustrate the framework of an
industrial economy.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the
framework of an industrisl economy by giving some examples. The mathemati-
cal model is given in Section 3. In this section we also state the first
order conditions for a Pareto efficient allocation. The institutional
framework to reach a Pareto efficient allocation is given in Section 4. In
Section 5 we give some numerical examples to illustrate the concept of an
industrial economy. Finally, in Section 6 we make some concluding remarks
and we discuss the possibilities for further research.
2. AN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY
An industrial economy consists of a number of (small) enterprises which
produce private commodities that are close substitutes or complements and
which have a common interest in maintaining the availability of a public
good, called the infrastructure. The presence of an infrastructure in-
creases the utility of the private goods or may even be a necessary com-
plement to them. Examples are:
a) atrZine transportation: several carrier companies provide substitutable
transport services; they have a common interest in for example air-
ports, a reservation network, safety measures,
b) tourtst fndustry: there are many enterprises providing servtces that
are close substitutes and complements (hotels, restaurants, entertain-
ment, travel agencies); these enterprises have a common intereat in for
example a clean and attractive environment, promotion activities and a
reputation for good quality of services,
c) surface transport: there are several modes of transportation which are
close substitutes and complements (bicycle. car, taxi, tramway, bus,
railroad); for each mode there are one or more enterprises providing
transportation services; producers of a mode have a common interest,
such as a road system or a railroad system and time and working
schedules.
Of course, there are much more examples, but the three given here are
specific in some aspecta. In example a) the private goods are close sub-
stitutes. The enterprises compete and they are comparable. Moreover, there
is only one public good for all, called the infrastructure. In example b)5
the private goods are both substitutes and complements. The enterprises
can be clustered in various branches each having a completely different
production technology (hotels, attractions, souvenir shops), and most of
these branches are competitive. The common infrastructure is induced
rather than planned and organized. In example c) the private gooda are
again close substitutes and complements (trains have connections with
buses). Some modes of transportation are competitive (taxis), but others
are monopolistic and regulated. Again there is a common infrastructure
from which some of the modes may benefit and some others may not. This
infrastructure is planned.
The central problem in all examples is the way in which the infrastruc-
ture is provided and financed. In the air industry example it seems to be
obvious that the enterprises organize and finance the infrastructure and
pass on the costs in the prices the consumers have to pay. However, the
consumers also benefit directly from the infrastructure. It enlarges their
possibilities to travel and therefore they should also show a willingness
to pay for having an airport. On the other hand, people living close to
the airport may suffer from its noise. We have similar characteristics in
the other examples. For organizing and financing the infrastructure we
distinguish the following cases:
i) the infrastructure is not planned or decided upon, but it results
from unorganized individual actions of the agents (e.g. it is attrac-
tive to do shopping in a city with a wide variety of supplies),
ii) there is an agent (a government or a private enterprise), who pro-
vides the infrastructure and who determines tariffs or prices for
making use of it (e.g. shopping center or sirport); an agent can
decide to take or leave the offer,
iii) the infrastructure is planned and organized by a specific agent who
has been established by the enterprises and by others who have in-
terest in the production of the industry.
Case i) is not relevant for our problem. Case 11) gives a way out of
our problem if the agent providing the infrastructure is economically
self-supporting or can make profits. It remains interesting to analyse the
rules of price setting with the theory developed here. Our approach is
mainly relevant for case iii). In this case either the infrastructure is
not apt for private (or profitable) exploitation, or there are political,
juridical and other non-economic elements involved that influence the6
productivity of an industry and its chances of survival. In the next sec-
tion we present e model for this case. From this model we derive condi-
tions for an efficient allocation. These conditions show that the prices
the agents are willing to pay for the privste commodities reveal their
preferences for the infrastructure.
3. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We consider a model of an industriel economy with two semi-public
goods, composed from private goods e and b and a public good. For example,
the public good is a road system that is used both by private cars, a, and
by public buses, b. There are two other commodities, private goods 1 and
2. There is a(possibly private) producer who plans and organizes the
level of the public infrastructure, z, taking into account the wishes of
the (transportation) industry. This industry has two branches, Yg and Yb,
each consisting of a representative private firm producing commodity a and
b respectively. For instance, the first firm leases private cars to con-
sumers and the second firm exploits the public bus system.
There are h consumers, indexed by i- 1,...,h. Each consumer i has a
utility function ul(xi,x2,yá,yb,z) on Xi - R5. Furthermore, each consumer
i faces individual semi-public (quantity) constraints on the consumption
yá and yb of the private goods a and b. That means. each consumer is con-
strained in his' or her's car driving and public transportation because of
the limitations of the road system. So, we assume that there are con-
straints cá(z) and cb(z) for i- 1,...,h, such that the consumption of
consumer i is restricted by




The industry is aware of these (subjective) constraints because it
observes rationing in the demand functions. Separate from these subjective
feasibility constraints, the respective technical production constraints
of the firms Ya and Yb are given by
Fa(ya;xi,x2) S 0 (3.3)7
and
Fb(yb;xb~x2) 5 0. (3.4)
where xi, x2 and xb, x2 are the amounts of input of commodity 1 and 2 in
the production of a and b respectively, whereas ya and yb are the amounts
of output of commodity a and b respectively. Moreover, we assume that firm
Yb faces a constraint
yb 5 cb(z). (3.5)
This constraint reflects the fact that the system of public transportation
is restricted by the limitations of the road system.
The enterprise producing the (public) infrastructure is given by the
technical constraint
Fz(z;xi,x2) 5 0, (3.6)
with xi and x2 the amounts of input. Finally, there is a firm which pro-
duces the commodities 1 and 2 from a production factor. Initially there is
a total endowment w of this production factor available. The technical
constraint of this firm is given by
Fo(xi,x2;w) 5 0, (3.7)
where xi and x2 are the output amounts of commodities 1 and 2 respec-
tively.
We assume that this economy, denoted by E-{(ul,cl,cb), i- 1,...,h,
Fa, (Fb,cb), Fz, Fo, w}, is regular, i.e., the utility and production
functions and the constraint functions are continuously differentiable,
the utility functions ul are quasi-concave, the production functions are
concave, and w is positive. Furthermore, we assume that in all technical
constraints both the inputs and the outputs are measured positively. From
this it follows that for r E{a,b,z,o}, and for the variables v- xi, x2,
xi, x2, xb, x2, xi, x2, ys, yb and z, holds
a
~Fr~~v C 0 if v is an input,8
and
~Fr~~v ) 0 if v is an output.
We are now ready to give some definitions.
Definition 3.1. An allocation
e-{(xi,x2,yá,yb),
i- 1,...,h, (ya,xi,x2),
(yb,xb,x2), ( z,xi,z2), (xi,x2)} is in the set A of feastble sllocations if
the constraints (3.1) -(3.~) hold, and if
Fi x~ t x~ ; x~ ' x~ 5 x~ ~- 1.2 (3.8)
~
~i ya S ya
Fi yb 5 Yb'
(3.9)
(3.10)
Observe that this definition includes the subjective constraints (3.1)
and (3.2). The quantity constraints (3.8) -(3.10) require that total
demand is less than or equal to total supply.
Definition 3.2. A feasible allocation e is efftcfent if there is a distri-
bution of strictly positive individual weights 8i, i- 1,...,h, for which
e maximizes the social welfare function
Fi giui(x1.x2.Ya.Yb.z)
over the set A of feasible allocations.
According to Definition 3.2 the necessary conditions for an allocation
of a regular economy to be efficient follow from the maximization problem,
max ïi 8iu1(xi.xZ.Ya.Yb.z). (3.11)
such that, with the shadow prices of the constraints between brackets,9
(al) yá - cá(z) s 0
yb - cb(z) s 0
(ë) Yb - cb(z) s 0
(~a) Fa(Ya:xi,x2) s 0
(~b) Fb(Yb:xb.x2) s 0
(az) Fz(z;xi,x2) s 0
Fo(xi,x2;w) s 0
(u~) ïi x~ t x~ t x~ } x~ s x~ j- 1.2
(Na) Fi Yá s Ya
(ub)
i
~i yb s yb.
Differentiating the corresponding Lagrange function with respect to the
variables between brackets, with j- 1,2 and i- i,...,h, gives,





8i c~u1~~yá - ai - ug - 0
8i ~ul~~yb - pl - ub - 0
-aa ~Fa~~yg t Na - 0
-~f - ~b ~Fb~~yb t ub - 0
(z) ïi 8i ~ul~~z i Ei al ~cá~~z t ii pi
t ~r ~cb~Dz - ~z ~Fz~Dz - 010
with all shadow prices nonnegative. With commodity 1 taken as the
numeraire, we obtain from these equations the next first order conditions
for an efficíent allocation. For all i,
c~ui~c~x2 ~Fr~~x2
r E {e,b,z,o}, (3.12)
c~ul~~xi - ~Fr~~xi
(x~) aa ~Fa~~x~ ; g~ - 0
(xb) ~b ~Fb~~xb t u~ - 0
(x~) az ~Fz~~x~ t N~ - 0
(x~) ao ~Fo~~x~ - u~ - 0.
c~ul~c~yá ~Fa~~ya ai
~ul~~xi - -~Fa~~xi } -~z~Fz~~xi
~ul~clyb ~FbI~Yb ë P1
i i- b b } z z z} z z z'




~uk~~z Ek ak~~á~~z Fk gk~cb~~z ~r~cb~~z
Fk k k} z z z } z z z ~ z z z




Condition (3.12) is the usual condition for private goods, saying that
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equals the marginal rate of trans-
formation (MRT). Notice that for each firm the two private commodities are
either both an output with positive derivative, or both an input with
negative derivative. The latter fact explains the minus signs in (3.13) -
(3.15). If ai - 0 for all i, then no consumer feels himself constrained in
the use of commodity s. This commodity is then a private good, having a11
uniform MRS equal to the MRT between a and the numeraire commodity. How-
ever, if al ) 0 for some i, then consumer i is willing to pay a mark-up on
the MRT of commodity a in order to subsidize an expansion of the infra-
structure. In the condition (3.14) for commodity b an extra term appears
in the equation. This term reflects the constraint of producer Yb with
respect to the availability z of the public good. If r- 0 then the pro-
ducer is not constrained and we have the same situation as for commodity
a. If y~ 0, the second term on the right hand side of equation (3.14)
reflects the additional costs the producer is willing to make for an ex-
pansion of the infrastructure, in order to enlarge his production pos-
sibilities. If gi ~ 0, then consumer i is willing to pay a mark-up on the
costs of commodíty b, including the costs the producer has to pay for the
expansion. All the mark-ups and the producer's costs for expanding the
public good reappear in (3.15). Notice that the mark-ups in (3.13) and
(3.14) reveal the willingness to pay for weakening of the constraints cá,
cb and cb, whereas the terms in (3.15) reveal the willingness to pay for
an expansion of the infrastructure. We see that the sum of the 1~tS's plus
the sum of the mark-ups of the consumers plus the mark-up of the producer
is equsl to the MRT of the public good. If ell mark-ups are equsl to zero,
then the public good behaves as a pure public good.
The main advantage of introducing semi-public goods in this way is that
an industrial economy can discriminate between agents who are and who are
not constrained by the infrastructure, because it can observe demand-be-
haviour. This information can partislly (and sometimes completely) solve
the difficult problem of determining the individual contributions to the
provision of e public good.
4. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we describe the institutional framework under which an
industrial equilibrium can be formulated satisfying the first order condi-
tions for efficiency. This institutional framework is the private owner-
ship industrial economy. In the economy E there are four private good
markets in operation: one for each good 1, 2, e and b. The demands and
supplies on these markets depend on the prices
pl, p2, pa, and pb, respec-
tively, with the price of the numeraire commodity, pl, equal to one. In an
efficient sllocation these prices are equal to the reapective MRT's. For12
the fifth commodity, the public good, the situation is much more compli-
cated. Later on we will make some simplifying assumptions. For the moment
we deal with the general model given in the previous section.
We assume that the industry is able to discriminate among consumers who







be the willingness of consumer i to pay for the weakening of the con-
straints cl(z) and cl(z) respectively. Then the sum of Ti(e) - ti(e)~ci~~z
i a i ib
a a a
and Tb(e) - tb(e)~cb~~z is his willingness to pay for the expansion of the
infrastructure. Suppose that this willingness to pay is known to the in-
dustry. Of course this is not an innocuous assumption, but it can be ap-
proached in reality under the simplifications we will make later on. Fur-
thermore, let tb(e) --y(azdFz~~xi)-1 and Tb(e) - tb(e)~cb~~z be the wil-
lingness of firm Yb to pay for weakening cb(z) and expanding z respec-
tively. This information is of course known to the industry. Finally, at
some ellocation e, denote the marginal rate of substitution of consumer i
between z and xl by pZ(e), i- 1,...,h. Now, the planner's task is to find
the desired level of infrastructure, i.e., to plan and to organize an
amount z such that the sum of the MRS's plus the total willingness to pay
is equal to the marginal rate of transformation, denoted by p(e).
z
Planner's problem: Find z such that
Fi CPZ(e) t Tá(e) t Tb(e)~ 4 Tb(e) - PZ(e). (4.1)
The price pz is the price to be paid by the planner to the producer for
each unit of the public good and equals the MRT. On the other hand, the
revenues of the planner consists of the consumers' contributions pl per
z
unit, and the mark-ups tá, tb and tb, per unit of consumption yá, yb and13
per unit of production yb, respectively. Since yb - ii yb if tb ) 0, the
planner's profit nq(p,z), where
p-(pl,p2,pa,pb)T, equals
nq(P.z) - Fi PZZ t Fi ~taYa '(tb 4 tb)Yb~ - Pzz -
Fi (táyá . tbyb) } tbyb - ïi (Tá t Tb)z - Tbz.
To complete the description of the economy, we assume that the private
firms are profit maximizing producers. We denote the respective profits by
no(p,z), na(p,z), nb(p,z) and nz(p,z). Since we assume that only the firm
producing the private commodities 1 and 2 is endowed with a production
factor, all individual labour and wealth in the economy is put in the
production function Fo. Wages are paid as profits. All profits are distri-
buted among the consumers, with, for i- 1,...,h and r E{o,a,b,z,q}, ~ir
the share of consumer i in the profit of firm (or planner) r. All shares
are nonnegative and Fi ~ir - 1 for all r. The income of consumer i at
(P.z) is given bY wi(P.z) - ïr ~irnr(P.z).
We are now able to define an industrisl equilibrium for the economy E.
Recall that a feasíble allocation satiafies (3.1) -(3.10).
Definition 4.1. An industrial equilibrium for the economy E is a feasible
allocation e - {(xi.x2.Ya.Yb), i - 1,...,h. (Ya,xl,x2). (Yb.xb,x2), (z.xl.
x2), (xi,x2)}, a set of prices
pl, p2, pa, pb for the private commodities
and a price pz for the public good, a set of individual prices pZ, i-
1,...,h, and a set of mark-ups tá, tb, i- 1,....,h, and tb, such that
1) for all i,






Plxl r P2x2 t(Patta)Yg f(Pbftb'tb)Yb t PZZ - wl(P,z),
2) each producer maximizes profit subject to his technical constraint,
i.e.,
n(P,z) - Plxi t p2x2 - max{plX
{ p22IFo(xi,
2;w) 5 0}
nz(P,z) - Pzz - plxi - p2x2 - max{pzz - plxi - p2x2IFz(z;xi,x2) 5 0}14
na(P.z) - PaYa - plxi - p2x2 - max{paYa - Plxl - P2xZIFa(Ya;xl,x2) S 0}
nb(P,z) - PbYb - plxb - p2x2 - max{pbYb - Plxb - P2x2~FbÍYb;xb,x2)S 0},
3) for all i, tl ) 0 implies yl - ci(z) and ti ) 0 implies yi - ci(z),
a s a b b b
11) t.b ) 0 implies Yb - cb(z),
5) (4.1) is satisfied, i.e., the planner equates marginal social costs
with marginal social benefits of z,
6) (3.8) -(3.10) are satisfied with equalities, i.e., the markets clear
demand and supply.
Notice that the availability of the public good is completely deter-
mined by the planner. So, actually the consumers do not maximize their
utility over z. Instead the prices pZ are determined such that for all i,
z is optimal under pZ. The same reasoning holds for the public good pro-
ducer, who determines pz given the amount z. The third condition has ana-
logies in fixed price theory, from which it is well-known that quantity-
constrained allocations can be sustained by virtual prices ( see e.g. Neary
and Roberts [12], Ruys [13], and Cornielje and van der Laan [4]). Here
condition 3) says that a consumer is not willing to pay a mark-up on the
cost price of a commodity if he or she i s not constrained in the use of
that commodity. Analogously, condition 4) says that the producer is wil-
ling to levy a mark-up on his output price pb if he is constrained by the
infrastructure level z. In this paper we assume that an equilibrium
exists. We will address the existence problem in a subsequent paper, see
also Section 6.
We now make some simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we assume without
loss of generality that the public good does not appear in the utility
function of the consumers, i. e., pz - 0 for all i. In this case the con-
sumers are only interested in the infrastructure i f they are constrained.
Now, the planner's problem becomes: find z such that
Ei [T8(e) t Tb(e)] ' Tbíe) - Pz(e). (4.2)15
Secondly, we assume that the consumers' constraint functions are linear
with constant term equal to zero, i.e. for all i,
ca(z) - alz
cb(z) - b1z.
In general, we are not able to say anything about the concavity or con-
vexit.y of the constraint functions. Both cases may occur. Therefore the
assumption of linear functions is very simplifying, but not too bad. For
simplicity we also assume that cb(z) - bpz. Now (4.2) becomes
Ei [alta(e) t bitb(e)~ t bptb(e) - Pz(e).
From this it follows that the planner's profit becomes equsl to zero.
Moreover, the coefficients al and bl follow from the consumption level of
the goods a and b of the constrained consumers. The willingness to pay can
be approached in reality if the consumers are partitioned in classes with
different needs to expand the infrastructure. These needs can be inferred
from the unconstrained demands for the goods a end b.
Under these simplifying assumptions the planner can obtain enough in-
formation to decide upon the infrastructure level z, given the mark-ups on
the cost-prices pa and pb. In this linear case, the infrastructure is
completely financed by the returns on the mark-ups on the prices of the
private goods.
5. EXAMPLES
For all firms we take constant returns to scale production functions,
ímplying that the firm with production function Fa, Fb and Fz respectively
is cost minimizing with, in equilibrium, zero profit. The income of con-
sumer i equals ~lrto, with y~i the share of i in the profit of the firm with
production function Fo. For the consumers we take Cobb-Douglas utility
functions. Recall that we assume that z does not appear in these func-
tions. Furthermore we assume that the consumers are not constrained in the
use of commodity b, i.e., bl - m for all i. This gives the next example.
For i- 1,...,h, the utility of consumer i is given by16
ul - piln xi t p21n x2 t páln yá t phln
yb
under yá s alz, where pi } p2 } pá } pb is normalized to one. The produc-
tion constraints are given by
Fo - 4~i(xi)2 . g~2(x2)2 - w2 S 0
Fz - ln z-~iln xi - p21n xZ 5 0 with 9~i f~2 - 1,
and for r E {a,b}
Fr - ln yr -~iln xi - 9~21n x2 5 0 with yii t y,2 - 1.
For firm Yb we have the quantity constraint yb s bpz.
Given prices pl and p2 we obtain from cost minimizing that for r E {a,b,z}
the conditional factor demand per unit of output is given by
r
~
xl - (P1P2~9~2P1) 2
r
~
x2 - (P2P1I~1P2) 1.
The zero profit condition gives
r r




Maximizing profit under Fo 5 0 gives the private goods supply functions
x~ - P~w~~~c ~ - 1,2, (5.4)
while the profit is given by
n
R ~ rw, (r~ r~)
with c2 - P1~9~1 ' P2IV2.
Utility maximizing of consumer i under the budget constraint17
Plxl } P2x2 t(Patta)Yg t(Pb'tb)Y~ - 9~icw
gives for the consumer's demand





For given z and demand yá, the mark-up tá is determined by firm Ya by
setting
tá - max{0,(pá9~lcw~aiz) - pa}. (5.9)
So, the mark-ups are determined by the industry such that the individual
demands do not exceed the individual constraints alz. From (5.7) and (5.9)
we obtain that
Y8 - Pa'Vlcw~pa and tá - 0 if pá9~icw~pa 5 aiz (5.10)
and
yá - aiz and tá -(páf~lcw~alz) - pa if pápicw~pa ) siz. (5.11)
Observe that the discrimination among consumers is determined by the para-
meters pl, ~ol and al. In fact, the willingness to pay increases with pi
a a
and pl and decreases with ai. Firm Yb determines the mark-up tb on his
output price pb such that the total demand yb does not exceed the con-
straint bpz. We obtain from (5.8) that
tb - max{0,(ii pbq~lcw~bpz) - pb}.
Hence
(5.12)
yb - pbf~lcw~pb and tb - 0 if ïi pbgilcw~pb s bpz (5.13)18
ana
yb - Pb9~lcw~(Pbttb) and tb - ( Fi Pb~icw,bpz) - pb
if ïi pb~lcw~pb ~ bpz. (5.14)
Finally the production levels ya and yb are set by the producers such that
they are equal to the total consumption, i.e.,
ya - ïi yá and yb - Fi yb. (5.15)
Notice that yb - bpz if ïi pb~lcw~pb ) bpz. Consequently, given the prices
pl and p2 and the infrastructure level z, the values of all other vari-
ables, prices, quantities and mark-ups, can be calculated through (5.1) -
(5.15). So, the equilibrium problem is to find market prices p and p and
1 2
a level z of the infrastructure such that the markets for the private
commodities 1 and 2 clear and the mark-up revenues are equal to the costs
of the infrastructure, i.e.,
ïi x~ t x~ t x~ - x~ - x~, j- 1,2 (market-condition)
and
ii altá t bptb - pz. (planner-condition)
In the next section we discuss this problem both from a numerical and
an economic viewpoint. Here we concentrate ourselves on the numerical
results. Using the computer code described in van der Laan and Seelen [8]
we have calculated the equilibrium with the following data.
Example 1. Number of consumers: 4. Input: w- 100. Constraint coefficient
producer Yb : bp - 4. The data of the other coefficients are given in the
Tables 1 and 2.19
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1 2 3 4
.4 .3 .2 .1
.1 .1 .1 .1
.5 .6 .7 .8
0 0 0 0
.1 .2 .3 .4
1 1 1 1
Observe that the budget shares for commodity b are zero for all consumers.
So, the demands for commodity b are zero, implying that firm Yb is not
active and tb - 0. The equilibrium values are given in Table 3 with the
unconstrained demands (i.e., with tá - 0) between brackets.
ExamPle 2. Same data as in Example 1 except that the budget shares for a
and b are equal to pá - 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, for i- 1,...,4, respectively,
and pb - 0.4 for all i. The equilibrium values are given in Table 4 with
again the unconstrained demands between brackets.20













xi x2 ya yb Z ti
i 0
a ~ n
i o.905 1.902 1.902 1.902
0




5.4 1.5 3.5 0 0 13.5
8.1 3.0 8.5 0 0 27.0
8.1 4.5 12.5 0 0.36 40.5
(14.9)
5.4 6.0 12.5 0 1.54 53.9
(22.7)
In the two examples the expenditures for the private commodities 1 and
2 are equal to each other. The only difference comes from the budget
shares for a and b. So, the total budget share for the "public" sector is
the same. This budget spent on the public sector finances the costs of the
total output of the three firms. Since the three firms have identical cost
structure and have constant returns to scale, the total output of the
three firms is equal for the two examples. However, in Example 1 all in-
come spent on the public sector is spent on commodity a. Because of the
constraints on the use of this commodity it results in a higher need for
the public good than in Example 2.
The results show that in Example 1 the consumers 3 and 4, being the
consumers with the highest profit shares and the highest budget shares for
a, are constrained in the use of the private commodity a. Notice that the
sum of the mark-ups these consumers are willing to pay for an expansion of
the infrastructure equals the price of one unit of the public good.21










xi x2 ya yb
1 0.905 i.902 1.902 1.902
o.i36





5.4 1.5 0.71 2.65 o i3.5
(2.84)
8.1 3.0 2.84 5.30 0 27.0
(5.67)
8.1 4.5 6.38 7.94 0 40.5
(8.50)
5.4 6.0 6.617 10.59 1.36 53.9
(ii.3) (1i.3)
For each consumer the sum of the unconstrained demands for a and b in
Example 2 is equal to the unconstrained demand for a in Example 1. Observe
that in Example 2 both the individual unconstrained demand for a and the
total unconstrained demand for b are less than the corresponding con-
straint function values given the level of infrastructure found in Example
1. So, for this level neither an individual nor the firm Yb is willing to
pay. Consequently, the infrastructure has been cut down to the level at
which the mark-ups are again high enough to cover the costs. In equilib-
rium, only consumer 4 is constrained in the use of commodity a. Moreover,
the production of firm Yb is constrained by the infrastructure, which
results in a mark-up tb on the price of commodity b, so that tá t 4tb
- pz
(planner-condition).
It is not difficult to gain some more insight from these examples.
Decreasing the coefficients ai will result in a higher willingness of the22
consumers to pay (see formula (5.11)). To remain in equilibrium this in-
duces a higher value of z, so that the producer would become unconstrained
for low enough values of the consumers' constraint coefficients. In this
case the infrastructure is financed by the consumers' mark-ups only. For
example, taking ei - 0.~5 for all i, the equilibrium values of tá, tb and
z become
tá - 0 for i-1,2, tá - 0.380, tá - 2.155, tb - 0, and z- ~.09.
On the other hand, increasing the coefficients al and~or decreasing the
producer's constraint coefficient bp results in a lower willingness of the
consumers to pay and~or a higher mark-up tb on the producer's price pb.
For ai - 0.~5i for i- 1,...,4, and bp - 2 we obtain that in equilibrium
tá - 0 for all i, tb - 0.95, and z- 9.452.
In this case the infrastructure is completely financed through the mark-up
the producer is willing to levy on his price pb. Because the consumers are
willing to spend 40z of their income on commodity b, the low constraint
coefficient bp enforces a(relatively) high level of z. In the first case
the infrastructure can be seen as a public good for which the willingness
to pay expresses the marginal utilities. In the latter case the infra-
structure can be seen as an investment of producer Yb, without which the
producer is not able to produce anything. For both alternatives the prices
are equal to those given in the examples.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper has been concerned with the problem of financing an infra-
structure needed for operating and utilizing private services and com-
modities. The paper has to be seen as a first attempt to give a solid
framework for the idea that the industry plays a central role in financing
the infrastructure. In fact, the infrastructure is financed through mark-
ups on the private services and commodities that make use of it. These
mark-ups come from the constraints experienced by the agents. With respect
to the consumers, the level of the infrastructure yields a(subjective)
constraint on their private consumption. In case of producers the level of
the infrastructure puts a constraint on their production possibilities.23
The mark-ups reveal these constraints and therefore the need for the in-
frastructure. Given the mark-ups the agents are willing to pay, the plan-
ner determines the optimal level of the infrastructure. In subsequent
papers we will develop this idea.
A first question concerns the existence of an industrial equilibrium
end the :aay in which the optimal level is determined. We want to make some
remarks on this subject. Therefore we return to the previous section, in
which we formulated the market-condition and the planner-condition. To
solve these equilibrium conditions we used a computer code based on sim-
plicisl approximation. We remark that the computational procedure adjusts
prices and quantities until an approximate equilibrium has been found. It
should be observed that all quantities are homogeneous of degree zero in
prices and mark-ups. So, by setting pl - 1, we can take commodity 1 as the
numeraire commodity. Then, for the examples considered in the previous
section, the problem reduces to finding a price p2 and a quantity z such
that the market-condition holds for j- 2 and the planner-condition is
satisfied. Then there is also equilibrium on the numeraire market (Walras'
property), since all consumers spend all their income. The algorithm ad-
justs pZ and z simultaneously until (approximate) equilibrium values have
been reached. So, numerically the price p2 and the quantity z are deter-
mined simultaneously. However, from an economic viewpoint we may consider
the following procedure. Suppose that, given p2, the industry (or planner)
solves the planner-condition, i.e., given p2 the plsnner searches for a
quantity z for which the plsnner-condition holds. Let z(p2) be this quan-
tity as a function of p2. On the other hand, let the market solve the
market-condition for j- 2 given a quantity z. So, the market determines a
price p2(z) for which the market for commodity 2 is in equilibrium. Start-
ing with either some p or some z, the quantity z and price p are ad-
2 ~ 2 „
justed subsequently and alternately until a price p2 and a quantity z are
found such that
N M M M
z- z(p2) and p2 - p2(z ).
M M
Such a pair (p2,z ) solves the equilibrium problem. Using this "Nash for-
mulation" we will investigate the conditions for the existence of an in-
dustrial equilibrium in e subsequent paper. One of the iasues ahowing up
is whether the constraint functions have to satisfy certain conditions.24
A second question concerns the problem of determining the mark-ups. We
want to elaborate the idea that the individusl mark-ups are determined by
the industry and are corporated in the prices the producers set for their
products. We may think of a partitioning of the consumers into a number of
groups. Then for each group the industry sets the mark-ups by considering
a representative agent. So, in this way we get different nriraa fnr dif-
ferent types of agents.
A third topic concerns the characterization of public goods by classi-
fying the agents who pay for it. The examples have shown that within the
same model the equilibrium may result in a situation in which either the
consumers, or the producers, or both types of agents finance the infra-
structure. This result urges us to be careful in making recommendations
for the way in which the costs of public goods should be shared. In the
near future we plan to do "cost-sharing" analysis for some (Dutch) "public
sector" industries.
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